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Abstract 
The proper scope of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions to combat parallel proceedings has 
been subject to much debate. Some have argued that arbitrators’ use of the injunctions 
requires restriction, while others argue that existing conditions and limitations are sufficient. 
This paper provides an outline of the sources from which arbitrators are empowered to order 
anti-suit injunctions, the development of the injunctions through cases, and the recent 
European Court of Justice decision in Gazprom. It briefly touches on court-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions, and the implications of the Brussels I Regulation for tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions. It concludes that the scope of anti-suit injunctions does not require further 
restriction. Reasons for this conclusion include the 2006 amendments to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law; commercial reasons; the need to prevent conflicting decisions; and the nature of 
arbitration as arising from private commercial arrangements between parties. 
Keywords: anti-suit injunction, arbitration, parallel proceedings, UNCITRAL Model Law, 
New York Convention, Gazprom, West Tankers, proper scope 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, non-substantive footnotes, and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14,500 words.  
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I Introduction 
International arbitration is an increasingly utilised dispute resolution method. Lew, Mistelis 
and Kröll describe arbitration as:1 
[A] specially established mechanism for the final and binding determination of 
disputes, concerning a contractual or other relationship with an international 
element, by independent arbitrators, in accordance with procedures, structures and 
substantive legal or non-legal standards chosen directly or indirectly by the parties. 
For many parties who agree to exclusively resolve disputes through arbitration, as opposed to 
through domestic courts, it is considered a useful means of quickly resolving disputes in a 
private and neutral forum.2 A minority choose to breach their arbitration agreements, 
however, by initiating proceedings in national courts contrary to exclusive arbitration 
agreements and already instituted arbitral tribunals. 
Parallel proceedings are problematic, because they can waste resources, serve merely to 
frustrate or delay proceedings, and can undermine parties’ arbitration agreements.3 They 
cause “fragmentation and unpredictability” through the possibility of conflicting decisions 
and enforcement difficulties.4  
While national courts are under a duty to stay their proceedings when disputes subject to 
arbitration come before them, because of article II of the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”),5 
occasionally this is insufficient. This is illustrated in a number of cases in which the courts 
have not referred parties to arbitration despite the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, and 
instead continued with hearing these cases domestically. As a result, anti-suit injunctions may 
occasionally be necessary to combat parallel proceedings.  
Parties may apply for anti-suit injunctions from two possible fora: the courts or arbitral 
tribunals. Court-ordered anti-suit injunctions are generally well accepted in Anglo-
commonwealth courts, however civil law jurisdictions have typically resisted their use. 
                                                 
1 Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003), at [1-1]. 
2 Joseph Lookofsky and Ketilbjørn Hertz Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of 
American, European, and International Law (3rd ed, JurisNet, New York, 2011) at 815. 
3 Olga Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?” (2015) 32(2) J.Int’l Arb. 173 at 174. 
4 At 174. 
5 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (signed 10 June 
1958, entered into force 07 June 1959) (“the New York Convention”). 
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Court-ordered injunctions maintain applicability in many common law jurisdictions today, 
but their scope has been curtailed in the European Union (the “EU”). Within many EU 
countries’ civil law systems, anti-suit injunctions are not viewed favourably, and this is 
reflected in the Brussels I Regulation6 and the relatively recent decision of Allianz SpA and 
Others v West Tankers Inc (“West Tankers”).7 As a result, court-ordered anti-suit injunctions 
are no longer permitted in the EU because of their inconsistency with the Brussels I 
Regulation. The unavailability of court-ordered anti-suit injunctions makes the case for 
retaining tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions more compelling.  
Over the course of time, tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions have received increasing 
international acceptance. Some commentators, such as Laurent Lévy,8 argue that the scope of 
the injunctions needs restriction, through the imposition of additional requirements.9 This 
paper argues that anti-suit injunctions does not need these further restrictions, because they 
are a necessary tool in the arbitral tribunal arsenal to prevent parties from breaching exclusive 
arbitration agreements. Moreover, the Advocate-General Wathelet’s opinion10 and the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) judgment in the Gazprom case,11 and amendments to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model 
Law”),12 support the current scope of the injunctions.13  
In Gazprom, the ECJ signalled its recognition of the injunctions as a legitimate tool able to be 
utilised by arbitral tribunals in support of arbitration.14 The ECJ held that anti-suit injunctions 
from tribunals do not infringe upon the principle of mutual trust accorded by EU Member 
States to each other’s legal systems and judicial institutions, as enshrined in the Brussels I 
Regulation. Therefore, whether EU member states are to enforce and recognise tribunal-
ordered anti-suit injunctions depends on each state’s individual interpretation of the New 
York Convention, which relates to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and their 
national arbitration laws. This places EU member states in the same situation as most other 
                                                 
6 Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters [2001] OJ L12/1 (“Brussels I Regulation”). 
7 Case C-185/07 Allianz SpA and Others v West Tankers Inc [2009] ECR I-663. 
8 Laurent Lévy is an experienced arbitrator, has taken part in numerous international arbitration proceedings, 
and has written a multitude of texts and articles on arbitration. He is a partner at Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler, and 
visiting professor at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London.  
9 Laurent Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators” (2005) IAI International Arbitration Series No. 2 
115. 
10 Case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO [2014]  (Opinion of Mr Advocate-General Wathelet 4 December 2014). 
11 Case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO [2015] (ECJ 13 May 2015). 
12 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) (the “UNICTRAL Model Law”).  
13 See discussion in part IV. 
14 Gazprom, above n 11.  
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countries, including New Zealand, with regards to the enforceability of tribunal-ordered anti-
suit injunctions. 
Many national arbitration laws are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law: 69 states, in 99 
jurisdictions, have national arbitration laws based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.15An 
example is the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996, which is based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and also incorporates the most recent amendments. In 2006, UNCITRAL made 
amendments to art 17, and inserted new articles: arts 17A to 17H. Article 17 now expressly 
provides for arbitral tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions, through the inclusion of art 
17(2)(b). It did not previously provide for anti-suit injunctions. Article 17(2)(b) provides that 
arbitral tribunals may, as a form of interim measure, order a party to “[t]ake action that would 
prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to cause, current or imminent harm or 
prejudice to the arbitral process itself”. The insertion of article 17H is also significant. Article 
17H sets out express provision for the recognition and enforcement of interim measures. This 
is of note, because prior to this amendment, it was unclear under the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, and remains unclear under the 1958 New York Convention for some jurisdictions,16 
whether courts had an obligation to enforce interim awards. 
This paper seeks to determine the proper scope of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions. It 
starts with an explanation of what parallel proceedings are defined as for the purpose of this 
paper in part II(A). Part II(B) considers the background to tribunal anti-suit injunctions, and 
includes discussion of the source of arbitrators’ powers, conditions that must be satisfied 
before tribunals will order anti-suit injunctions, and the enforcement of the injunctions. Part 
II(C) maps the development of anti-suit injunctions, and analyses the recent Gazprom case. 
Part III briefly touches on court-ordered anti-suit injunctions, because these are relevant to 
arguments concerning the scope of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions. Part IV will 
consider arguments commonly put forward in support of narrowing the scope of anti-suit 
injunctions, and will counter these arguments with reasons as to why the scope of the 
injunctions does not need restricting. Part V provides a conclusion to the paper as a whole. 
The focus of this paper is on the use of anti-suit injunctions in international commercial 
arbitration. References are occasionally made to the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention”) 
and arbitral cases decided under the umbrella of ICSID, however, for comparative purposes.  
                                                 
15 UNCITRAL “Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
amendments as adopted in 2006” <www.uncitral.org>. 
16 Jurisdictions in which enforcement remains unclear are those that have not incorporated the most recent 
amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
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II Tribunal-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Part II begins with a brief explanation of the definition of parallel proceedings as referred to 
in this paper. It then examines the development of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions, the 
source of tribunals’ powers to grant the injunctions, and the enforceability of tribunal-ordered 
anti-suit injunctions. It also contrasts and compares tribunal-ordered and court-ordered anti-
suit injunctions, in order to determine which are likely to be more advantageous to parties 
seeking a stay domestic court proceedings. This part is intended to provide readers with a 
background to the arguments made in part IV. 
A What Are Parallel Proceedings in the Context of This Paper? 
By way of background, it is important to understand what is meant by parallel proceedings in 
this paper, so as to fully understand the concepts and arguments discussed below. 
The test that courts and tribunals apply in international arbitration to determine whether 
proceedings are parallel differs from the usual triple identity test.17 The triple identity test 
requires two sets of proceedings to have the same facts, the same parties, and the same causes 
of action.18 In the context of international arbitration, while the test remains relevant, it is 
interpreted in a broader sense.19 The focus, instead, is on the core of the dispute, and whether 
this is the same across the proceedings.20 The formal identities of the parties, causes of action, 
and the facts are less crucial, although in many cases, the actual parties to the proceedings 
must still be identical.21 This is illustrated in the ICSID arbitration case of Millicom 
International Operations BV and Sentel GSM SA v The Republic of Senegal (“Millicom v 
Senegal”).22  
Millicom v Senegal involved a number of related companies, who were involved in a dispute 
with the Republic of Senegal (“Senegal”).23 The related companies included Sentel GSM SA 
(“Sentel”), Millicom International Operations (“MIO”), and Millicom International Cellular 
SA Group (“MIC”). Sentel was a Senegalese company; MIO was a company based in the 
                                                 
17 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 184. 
18 At 184. 
19 At 184. 
20 At 184. 
21 At 184. 
22 Millicom International Operations BV and Sentel GSM SA v The Republic of Senegal (Decision on 
Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal) ARB/08/20, 16 July 2010 (“Millicom v Senegal, Decision on 
Jurisdiction”, and (Decision on the Application for Provisional Measures) ARB/08/20, 09 December 2009 
(“Millicom v Senegal, Decision on Provisional Measures”). 
23 The full facts can be found in [1]-[24] of Millicom v Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction.  
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Netherlands; and MIC operated out of Luxembourg. MIC owned 100% of MIO’s shares, and 
MIO owned 99% of Sentel’s shares.  
Sentel operated a telecommunications network in Senegal under a twenty year concession 
granted by Senegal. In response to breaches Senegal alleged Sentel had committed against the 
terms of the concession, Senegal issued a decree terminating the concession.24 After this 
decree, MIC, MIO, and Sentel were all involved to varying degrees with negotiations and 
communications with Senegal.25 A dispute eventually arose as to whether the decree had 
actually terminated the concession.26 
Senegal initiated court proceedings against MIC and Sentel, requesting a ruling regarding the 
termination of the concession.27 On the same day, MIO and Sentel commenced arbitration.28 
While the parties to the court proceedings (MIC and Sentel against Senegal) and the 
arbitration proceedings (MIO and Sentel against Senegal) were not identical, the arbitral 
tribunal nevertheless proceeded to recommend an anti-suit injunction,29 requesting that the 
proceedings in the Dakar Regional Court be stayed pending a decision by the arbitral tribunal 
on its jurisdiction.30 The arbitral tribunal said that it was sufficient that the cases centred on 
the continued applicability of the concession.31 The different parties to the court and arbitral 
proceedings did not affect the tribunal’s ability to issue an anti-suit injunction.32 
Another ICSID arbitration case in which broadly similar, but not identical facts, were no 
hindrance to a tribunal issuing an anti-suit injunction is CSOB v Slovakia.33 In CSOB, an 
arbitral tribunal issued an anti-suit injunction against bankruptcy proceedings in the 
Bratislava Regional Court in Slovakia. The arbitral tribunal recommended that the parties 
suspend the bankruptcy proceedings “to the extent that such proceedings might include 
determinations as to whether the [claimant] has a valid claim in the form of a right to receive 
funds from the Slovak Republic to cover its losses as contemplated in the Consolidation 
Agreement at issue in this arbitration”.34 
                                                 
24 At [15]. 
25 At [9]-[21]. 
26 See [22] and [23]. 
27 At [23]. 
28 At [23]. 
29 This is because in ICSID arbitration, rather than making orders, arbitral tribunals make recommendations to 
the parties. While the recommendations do not have to be followed by the parties, they are generally followed in 
practice.  
30 Millicom v Senegal, Decision on Provisional Measures, at [49]. 
31 At [45].  
32 At [45]. 
33 CSOB v Slovakia (Procedural Order No. 4), ICSID Arb/97/4, 11 Jan 1999. 
34 At [7]. 
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Millicom v Senegal35 and CSOB v Slovakia36 illustrate the looser criteria applied by tribunals 
when determining whether proceedings are parallel for the purposes of an anti-suit injunction. 
It is important to bear in mind this definition of parallel proceedings when considering cases 
and further discussion in this paper.  
B When Are Provisional Measures, Including Anti-Suit Injunctions, Ordered?  
1 Source of Arbitrators’ Powers to Issue Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Anti-suit injunctions are recognised in the UNCITRAL Model Law as a form of interim, or 
provisional, measure.37 Arbitral tribunals’ powers to order provisional measures can derive 
from a number of sources, because no single law applies in international arbitration.38 The 
sources can include a mix of arbitration agreements, arbitration rules, and national arbitration 
laws, and these are regulated “by an often complex maze of national and international 
rules”.39  
Lew, Mistelis, and Kröll helpfully explain how they all interact:40 
The agreement of the parties (1) will prevail over the provisions in the chosen 
arbitration rules (2) which in turn prevail over international arbitration practice (3) 
and applicable law (4). In this hierarchy the norms of a lower stage are superseded 
by those of a higher stage and are only applicable where there is no regulation in 
any of the proceeding stages. By corollary, in the absence of agreement as to 
specific rules or arbitration rules it is the applicable law (4) that will govern the 
arbitration. 
Below, the sources from which arbitrators’ powers to order provisional measures may derive 
are discussed. It is important to understand from whence the powers originate, for without the 
power to order provisional measures, arbitrators are unable to order anti-suit injunctions.  
 
 
                                                 
35 Millicom v Senegal, above n 22. 
36 CSOB v Slovakia, above n 33. 
37 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 17. 
38 Lookofsky and Hertz Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of American, 
European, and International Law, above n 2, at 816. 
39 At 816. 
40 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [2-45]. 
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(a) Arbitration agreements 
One of the four fundamental features of arbitration is that it is “selected and controlled by the 
parties”.41 Parties have the autonomy to determine the exact way in which they wish for 
arbitration to go ahead, subject to some restrictions.42 “Party autonomy” is a long standing 
principle in international commercial arbitration.43 For example, it is acknowledged in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, the 1958 New York Convention, and the ICSID Arbitration rules.44 
Stemming from party autonomy and parties’ consent to arbitrate, where an arbitration 
agreement provides for arbitration as an exclusive dispute resolution mechanism, it “obliges 
the parties to honour this commitment and provides the basis for the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal”.45 If parties have agreed to exclusive arbitration, this means they have 
agreed not to seek recourse from domestic courts, and so should restrict the resolution of any 
disputes to arbitration alone.46 This contractual obligation is one reason cited in support of 
anti-suit injunctions, for without the power to order the injunctions, tribunals have no means 
of enforcing arbitration agreements.47 This arguments gains further traction considering the 
restrictions imposed following West Tankers on court-ordered anti-suit injunctions in the 
EU.48  
Where an arbitration agreement does not specify whether an arbitral tribunal can order 
provisional measures, most arbitral tribunals, by default, have the power to order provisional 
measures.49 This is the case even where national laws and arbitration rules do not expressly 
provide arbitrators with the power to grant provisional measures, because arbitrators are 
                                                 
41 At [1-7]. 
42 At [1-11]. See also Alan Redfern and others Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (5th 
ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2009) at [6-02]. 
43 At [6-03]. 
44 At [6-03]. 
45 Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds) Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 1999) at [624.] 
46 At [624]. 
47 See Part IV(E). 
48 See Part III(B).  
49 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [23-30]. For 
example, the arbitration agreement in Mantovani v Caparelli [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 375 (CA), cited at [23-7]-
[23-14] and [23-116]. See also the discussion of international arbitration rules from [23-23]-[23-29]. Also 
relevant here is Gaillard and Savage Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 
above n 45, at [1319]; and Christoph H Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1st ed, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2001), chapter on article 47, at [7]. 
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assumed to have an implied power to grant the measures.50 The rationale for this assumption 
is: 51 
[B]y the arbitration agreement the parties give the tribunal the powers necessary to 
settle their dispute … [which] includes any measure of provisional relief which is 
necessary to safeguard the rights of the parties and the efficiency of the tribunal’s 
decision-making.  
Parties can disempower arbitrators from ordering the measures, however, by expressly 
excluding them from the scope of the arbitration agreement. This is reflected in article 17(1) 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which provides that an arbitral tribunal may order 
provisional measures unless the parties have agreed otherwise: 
Article 17 Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request 
of a party, grant interim measures. 
There are restrictions, however, on parties’ autonomy to determine the scope of their 
arbitration agreements.52  
First, the parties must be treated equally by the arbitral tribunal.53 This is enshrined in article 
18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law: 
Article18. Equal treatment of parties 
The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case.  
Second, the powers conferred upon an arbitral tribunal by means of an arbitration agreement 
cannot “cause the arbitration to be conducted in a manner contrary to the mandatory rules or 
public policy of the state in which the arbitration is held”.54 Public policy is discussed further 
below in relation to the enforcement of anti-suit injunctions.55  
                                                 
50 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [23-30].  
51 At [23-30]. 
52 Alan Redfern and others Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, above n 42, at [6-05]; 
Lookofsky and Hertz Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of American, 
European, and International Law, above n 2, at 819. 
53 Alan Redfern and others Law and Practice of International Commercial, above n 42, at [6-06]. 
54 At [6-07]. 
55 See Part II(B)(4). 
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Arbitration rules, as specifically included in arbitration agreement, may also restrict party 
autonomy, although there are only a small number of rules that impose compulsory 
restrictions.56  
Lastly, arbitral tribunals are generally unable to make orders that affect third parties to the 
proceedings, so the inclusion of such powers in an arbitration agreement would be invalid.57 
This restriction underscores tribunals’ inability to order anti-suit injunctions directly against 
the domestic courts in which parallel proceedings are taking place. Instead, arbitral tribunals 
can only order the injunctions against the parties to the arbitration. 
(b) Arbitration rules 
To preface this subsection on arbitration rules, a general explanation on the relevance of 
arbitration rules to international arbitration is necessary.  
When parties enter into agreements to arbitrate, they can choose either institutional 
arbitration or ad hoc arbitration.58 Ad hoc arbitration involves an arbitral tribunal being 
specifically constituted to address the parties’ dispute; institutional arbitration differs in that 
arbitration takes place “under the auspices of a particular institution”.59 Such institutions 
include the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”), the American Arbitration 
Association, and the London Court of International Arbitration (the “LCIA”).60 Institutions 
often have their own rules and procedures, may provide a “watchdog” function, and may 
provide parties with services such as meeting rooms in which arbitration can take place.61 
In ad hoc arbitration, parties may agree for specific arbitration rules to govern their 
disputes.62 Below is an example of a clause in an arbitration agreement incorporating the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration rules:63 
All disputes arising in connection with the present contract shall be settled by 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules. 
                                                 
56 Alan Redfern and others Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, above n 42, at [6-08]. 
57 At [6-09]. 
58 Lookofsky and Hertz Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of American, 
European, and International Law, above n 2, at 830. 
59 At 830. 
60 At 830. 
61 At 830. See also 830-832 for more information on institutional arbitration. 
62 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [2-45]; Lookofsky 
and Hertz Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of American, European, and 
International Law, above n 2, at 818. 
63 At 818. 
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Arbitration rules vary in their treatment of provisional measures, but typically empower 
arbitrators the power to grant them.64  
For example, article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which for the most part reflects 
articles 17 to 17G of the UNCITRAL Model Law, empowers arbitrators to order provisional 
measures. The power to issue anti-suit injunctions is bolded in the below excerpt from article 
26: 
 Article 26 
1. The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant interim measures. 
2. An interim measure is any temporary measure by which, at any time prior to 
the issuance of the award by which the dispute is finally decided, the arbitral 
tribunal orders a party, for example and without limitation, to: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determining of the dispute 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is 
likely to cause, (i) current or imminent harm or (ii) prejudice to the 
arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may 
be satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the 
dispute 
[other paragraphs omitted; emphasis added] 
A similar provision empowering arbitral tribunals to issue provisional measures, although 
less detailed, can be found in article 28 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration (the “ICC rules”).  
Article 28: Conservatory and Interim Measures 
1) Unless the parties have otherwise agreed, as soon as the file has been 
transmitted to it, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party order any 
interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate. The arbitral tribunal 
may make the granting of any such measure subject to appropriate security 
being furnished by the requesting party. Any such measure shall take the 
form of an order, giving reasons, or of an award, as the arbitral tribunal 
considers appropriate.  
                                                 
64 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [23-23]-[23-29]. 
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[paragraph 2 omitted] 
In contrast with the UNCITRAL rules, the ICC rules do not provide specifically for anti-suit 
injunctions. Neither does article 25.1 of the LCIA rules, which provides: 
Article 25 Interim and Conservatory Measures 
25.1 The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power upon the application of any 
party, after giving all other parties a reasonable opportunity to respond to such 
application and upon any such terms as the Arbitral Tribunal considers 
appropriate in the circumstances: 
(i) to order any respondent party to a claim or cross-claim to provide security for 
all or part of the amount in dispute, by way of deposit or bank guarantee or in any 
other manner; 
(ii) to order the preservation, storage, sale or other disposal of any documents, 
goods, samples, property, site or thing under the control of any party and relating 
to the subject-matter of the arbitration; and 
(iii) to order on a provisional basis, subject to a final decision in an award, any 
relief which the Arbitral Tribunal would have power to grant in an award, 
including the payment of money or the disposition of property as between any 
parties. 
Such terms may include the provision by the applicant party of a cross-indemnity, 
secured in such manner as the Arbitral Tribunal considers appropriate, for any 
costs or losses incurred by the respondent party in complying with the Arbitral 
Tribunal’s order. Any amount payable under such cross-indemnity and any 
consequential relief may be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal by one or more 
awards in the arbitration.  
As the articles above illustrate, depending on the rules agreed upon by the parties, the powers 
of arbitral tribunals to order provisional measures may differ. This is further complicated by 
the existence of national laws.  
(c) National laws  
As mentioned above, where arbitration agreements are silent on provisional measures, 
national laws will generally flesh out the arbitration process.65 Any mandatory rules in the 
                                                 
65 Alan Redfern and others Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, above n 42, at [6-17]; 
and UNCITRAL Model Law, Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, at 25. 
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domestic law of the lex arbitri, or the law applying to the arbitration, must be followed by the 
arbitral tribunal.66 This is relevant to anti-suit injunctions, because many national arbitration 
laws are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.67  
The UNCITRAL Model Law specifically provides for anti-suit injunctions as provisional 
measures through article 17(2)(b). This provision was inserted, along with a number of 
others, as amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law in 2006.68 
Article 17 Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of 
a party, grant interim measures. 
(2) An interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in the form of an award 
or in another form, by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award by 
which the dispute is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party to: 
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute; 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is 
likely to cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the 
arbitral process itself; 
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award 
may be satisfied; or 
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of 
the dispute. 
[emphasis added] 
Article 17(1) provides that an arbitral tribunal, governed by domestic law based on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, will have the power to grant interim measures provided the parties 
have not agreed otherwise. It specifically empowers tribunals to order anti-suit injunctions, 
through the inclusion of article 17((2)(b), if the injunctions are necessary to prevent “current 
or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself”. 
                                                 
66 Lookofsky and Hertz Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of American, 
European, and International Law, above n 2, at 819. A recent example of a case in which parties failed to 
follow mandatory rules in the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996 is the case of Carr v Galloway Cook Allan 
[2014] NZSC 75. 
67 See UNCITRAL “Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with 
amendments as adopted in 2006” <www.uncitral.org>. 
68 Art 17(2)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law is also discussed in Part IV(A). See Sundaresh Menon and Elaine 
Chao “Reforming the Model Law Provisions on Interim Measures of Protection” (2006) 2 AIAJ 1 at 6 for a 
detailed discussion of the amendments. 
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Whether national laws provide tribunals with the power to issue provisional measures varies. 
Domestic legislation generally falls into one of three categories.  
First, where domestic legislation provides arbitrators broad powers to grant provisional 
measures.69 This is the approach taken by the UNCITRAL Model Law. Second, where 
domestic laws specify the provisional measures that arbitrators may grant, with any further 
measures unavailable unless explicitly provided for in an arbitration agreement.70 Third, 
where domestic laws deny arbitrators the power to grant any provisional measures except 
where otherwise expressly provided in an arbitration agreement.71 For example, New 
Zealand’s Arbitration Act 1996 is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, and includes the 
amendments from 2006. Section 17A of the Arbitration Act replicates article 17(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, and s 17 incorporates article 17(2).  
In addition to expressly providing arbitral tribunals with the power to issue anti-suit 
injunctions, article 17H of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for their enforcement. 
Article 17H article is discussed in greater detail in Part II(A)(3). 
2 Various Conditions Must Be Met Before Tribunals May Order Anti-Suit Injunctions 
There are conditions that a party seeking an anti-suit injunction must meet before a tribunal 
will grant an injunction. These requirements emphasise the significant effect provisional 
measures can have on parties, and reinforce the need for arbitral tribunals to order them 
sparingly.72   
The conditions include: 
 The risk of prejudice to the arbitral process itself; 
 The risk of irreparable harm; 
 The likelihood of success on the merits of the case 
 An element of urgency; and 
 A tribunal with prima facie competence to hear the merits of the case.  
Below each of the conditions is discussed specifically in relation to anti-suit injunctions, with 
examples of their application in Millicom v Senegal.73 Provisions from the UNCITRAL 
Model Law are included where relevant. 
                                                 
69 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [23-16] to [23-17]. 
70 At [23-20]. 
71 At [23-22]. 
72 At [23-4]. See also Millicom v Senegal, Decision on Provisional Measures, above n 22, at [38] and [50].  
73 Millicom v Senegal is discussed in greater detail in Part II(A). 
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(a) Risk of prejudice to the arbitral process itself 
Anti-suit injunctions are often issued to prevent “prejudice to the arbitral process itself”.74 
This includes ensuring the enforceability of future awards. This condition is provided in 
article 17(2)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law: 
Article 17.  Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures 
… 
(2) An interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in the form of an 
award or in another form, by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award 
by which the dispute is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party to: 
… 
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is 
likely to cause, current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral 
process itself; 
[remaining provisions omitted] 
Article 17(2)(b) was added by UNCITRAL to explicitly provide for tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions.75 The rationale for the provision was to ensure arbitral tribunals could “prevent 
obstruction or delay of the arbitral process” by parties seeking recourse in domestic courts, or 
in separate arbitral tribunals, contrary to exclusive arbitration agreements.76  
UNCITRAL intended for the anti-suit injunctions issued in accordance with article 17 to be 
ordered as interim measures against parties instigating either court proceedings or other 
arbitral proceedings.77 Arguments against the amendments, based on the lack of familiarity of 
civil law jurisdictions with anti-suit injunctions, were made, but UNCITRAL rejected the 
arguments.78  
UNCITRAL justified the amendments on these grounds:79  
 The increasingly widespread utilisation of anti-suit injunctions generally;  
                                                 
74 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art 26; UNCITRAL Model Law, art 17(2)(b). 
75 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its thirty-ninth session 
A/61/17 (2006) at [93]. 
76 Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation on the work of its forty-third session 
A/CN.0/589 (2005) at [20]. 
77 At [21]. 
78 At [23]. 
79 At [23]. 
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 The importance of anti-suit injunctions in facilitating international trade; and  
 Parties in civil and common law jurisdictions occasionally breach exclusive 
arbitration agreements, so tribunals in both types of jurisdictions need the power order 
parties to stay proceedings. 
UNCITRAL concluded that it is “legitimate for arbitral tribunals to seek to protect their own 
process” by issuing anti-suit injunctions against recalcitrant parties.80 
An example of this condition operating in practice can be found in Millicom v Senegal.81 In 
Millicom, the claimants requested an anti-suit injunction based on their “right to continue 
bringing their claims without the arbitration proceedings becoming meaningless owing to a 
judgment to the contrary passed by the Senegalese courts”.82  
(b) The risk of irreparable harm 
Article 17A of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides conditions for granting interim 
measures. Article 17A(1)(a) sets out the requirement of a risk of irreparable harm: 
Article 17 A.  Conditions for granting interim measures  
(1) The party requesting an interim measure under article 17(2)(a), (b) and (c) shall 
satisfy the arbitral tribunal that:  
(a) Harm not adequately reparable by an award of damages is likely to 
result if the measure is not ordered, and such harm substantially outweighs 
the harm that is likely to result to the party against whom the measure is 
directed if the measure is granted;  
[other provisions omitted] 
Tribunals are required to consider whether there is a risk of harm, to ensure that ordering an 
anti-suit injunction is “necessary and proportional” to the harm that may arise as a result of 
the issuance of the injunction.83 Menon and Chao suggest that the test applied may be similar 
to the common law “balance of convenience” test.84  
                                                 
80 At [23]. 
81 Millicom v Senegal, above n 22. 
82 Millicom v Senegal, Decision on Provisional Measures, at [44].  
83 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 190. 
84 Menon and Chao “Reforming the Model Law Provisions on Interim Measures of Protection”, above n 68, at 
8. 
LAWS521 Final Paper Stephanie Lie Luxford 
 
19 
 
It is argued that a case meets the requisite threshold if:85 
 A judgment rendered in parallel proceedings would be made public; or 
 The overall dispute would be aggravated should the parallel proceedings be allowed 
to continue. 
A dispute may be aggravated if there would be higher costs associated with resolving the 
dispute in more than one forum; the parallel proceedings may cause delay in resolving the 
dispute; there is a risk of inconsistent judgments; and the inconsistent judgments could lead to 
enforcement issues.86 
The risk of irreparable harm was also considered by the arbitral tribunal in Millicom v 
Senegal. The tribunal concluded that there was a risk of irreparable harm, because allowing 
Senegal to continue with its court proceedings could seriously affect the enforceability of any 
award rendered by the tribunal, especially if the award proved to be at odds with the 
judgment produced by the courts.87  
(c) The requirement of urgency and the likelihood of success on the merits of the case 
Another requirement is that parties must be likely to succeed on the merits of the case before 
an arbitral tribunal will issue a provisional measure. This requirement can be found in article 
17A of the UNCITRAL Model Law: 
Article 17 A. Conditions for granting interim measures  
(1) The party requesting an interim measure under article 17(2)(a), (b) and (c) shall 
satisfy the arbitral tribunal that: 
… 
(b) There is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will succeed on 
the merits of the claim. The determination on this possibility shall not affect 
the discretion of the arbitral tribunal in making any subsequent 
determination. 
[article 17A(2) omitted] 
                                                 
85 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 190.  
86 At 190-191. These factors are from ICC Case No 8307. See also Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration, above n 14, at [23-42]; and Gaillard and Savage Fouchard Gaillard 
Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, above n 45, at [1326] and [1334]. 
87 Millicom v Senegal, Decision on Provisional Measures, above n 22, at [47]. 
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There must also be an element of urgency before anti-suit injunction may be granted. This 
was illustrated in Millicom v Senegal, in which the tribunal said that the requirement of 
urgency is satisfied where a party has “proven that if the measures are not ordered rapidly, 
there are serious risks that the rights of applicants will be jeopardised”.88 
(d) Prima facie competence to decide on the merits of the case 
Last, an arbitral tribunal must establish that it has prima facie competence to decide on a 
case’s merits before it is able to order an anti-suit injunction.  
For example, in Millicom v Senegal, the arbitral tribunal found that it had prima facie 
competence to decide on the case’s merits, and then proceeded to recommend an anti-suit 
injunction.89 The mere fact that one party is contesting an tribunal’s jurisdiction is insufficient 
to render the tribunal prima facie incompetent.90 On the other hand, simply bringing 
proceedings to establish jurisdiction is also inadequate on its own to establish prima facie 
jurisdiction.91  
The tribunal in Millicom said:92 
[W]hile waiting for a decision to be given on the merits of a case and provided that 
the conditions have been met, the aim is to ensure as far as possible that no 
decisions can be taken that risk depriving that decision of its main effect in fact. 
After an “initial analysis” of the case, the tribunal in Millicom found that it had prima facie 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute, and the potential to recommend an anti-suit injunction.93 
Once the above conditions have been met, there is still the issue of whether or not anti-suit 
injunctions are enforceable. Enforcement is not guaranteed in all jurisdictions, because of 
uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of the New York Convention and the lack of 
incorporation by the majority of jurisdictions of amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
                                                 
88 At [43]. 
89 At [43]. 
90 At [42]. 
91 At [42]. 
92 At [42]. 
93 At [42]-[43]. 
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3 Enforcement of Anti-Suit Injunctions Under The New York Convention and The 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
The enforcement of anti-suit injunctions, along with other provisional measures generally, is 
unclear. This is because of uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the New York 
Convention. As mentioned above, article 17H of the UNCITRAL Model Law has helped 
provide clarity in states that have adopted the most recent amendments to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. Enforcement under both the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model 
Law is considered below. 
(a) The New York Convention 
The New York Convention relates to the enforcement of arbitral awards. There are 
approximately 150 contracting states to the 1958 New York Convention.94 Article 1(1) of the 
New York Convention provides that the Convention applies to: 
[T]he recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a 
State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards 
are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or 
legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the 
State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.  
It interacts with domestic legislation by setting the minimum standard that must be adhered to 
in contracting states.95  
Of particular relevance to the enforcement of provisional measures is article III: 
Article III 
Each Contracting State shall recognise arbitral awards as binding and enforce them 
in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied 
upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. 
[final sentence omitted] 
The problem with article III is that it is unclear as to what arbitral awards come within the 
scope of the Convention. This lack of clarity means there is no obvious indication as to 
                                                 
94 Lookofsky and Hertz Transnational Litigation and Commercial Arbitration: An Analysis of American, 
European, and International Law, above n 2, at 844. 
95 At 845. Refer to Part II(B)(1) for discussion on national laws.  
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whether the Convention requires contracting states to enforce provisional measures.96 This 
uncertainty was considered in Gazprom, in which the European Court of Justice (“the ECJ”) 
acknowledged that whether an anti-suit injunction is enforceable in a given state depends on 
the case law in that state on how the New York Convention should be interpreted.97  
This issue with the New York Convention is, however, addressed to a limited extent by the 
insertion of article 17H into the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
(b) The UNCITRAL Model Law 
Article 17H(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for the enforcement of provisional 
measures, including anti-suit injunctions. It provides:  
An interim measure issued by an arbitral tribunal shall be recognised as binding 
and, unless otherwise provided by the arbitral tribunal, enforced upon application 
to the competent court, irrespective of the country in which it was issued, subject to 
the provisions of article 17 I. 
The article specifically provides that interim measures, such as anti-suit injunctions, are 
binding, and should be enforced by courts regardless of the country in which the measure was 
issued. Article 17H of the UNCITRAL Model Law does not consider anti-suit injunctions 
arbitral awards as such, but rather provides for a separate means by which they can be 
enforced.98 The article was inserted to address concerns that parties were denied “effective 
relief” because of “the ease and speed with which assets can be transferred out of a 
jurisdiction in order to avoid satisfying an arbitral award” and because of “increasingly 
sophisticated parties” with “higher expectations of their ability to enforce their rights”.99 Born 
says that the article “is a desirable addition to the Model Law that would enhance the efficacy 
of the arbitral process”.100 
As mentioned above, New Zealand has adopted the most recent amendments to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, which include article 17H. The Arbitration Act 1996 defines 
awards as meaning “a decision of the arbitral tribunal on the substance of the dispute and 
includes any interim, interlocutory, or partial award”.101 New Zealand is rather pioneering, 
                                                 
96 Gary B Born International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2009) at 
2020-2023. 
97 Gazprom OAO, above n 11, at [41]-[42]. 
98 Born International Commercial Arbitration, above n 96, at 2024. 
99 Menon and Chao “Reforming the Model Law Provisions on Interim Measures of Protection”, above n 68, at 2 
and 17. 
100 Born International Commercial Arbitration, above n 96, at 2026. 
101 Arbitration Act 1996, s 2. 
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however, in adopting the amendments: out of the 99 jurisdictions with national arbitration 
laws based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, only 16 have adopted the most recent 
amendments.102 Therefore, the extent to article 17H will have an overall impact upon the 
enforceability of anti-suit injunctions globally is questionable.  
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, whether tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions are binding 
and enforceable will still rest on domestic courts’ interpretation of the 1958 New York 
Convention. These enforcement difficulties are often cited as a reason against a wide scope 
for anti-suit injunctions.103 In addition to the lack of clarity surrounding whether anti-suit 
injunctions are enforceable at all, there are grounds on which domestic courts can refuse 
enforcement. 
4 Grounds for Refusing Enforcement of Anti-Suit Injunctions  
The grounds on which states can refuse to enforce anti-suit injunctions are provided in article 
V of the New York Convention. The article provides: 
Article V 
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the 
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent 
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
 
(a) The parties to the agreement … were … under some incapacity, or the said 
agreement is not valid … ; or 
(b) The party against whom the award was invoked was not given proper notice 
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration … ; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was 
not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took 
place; or 
                                                 
102 The jurisdictions that adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law with the 2006 amendments include Australia 
(includes New South Wales, Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western 
Australia), Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, Costa Rica, Georgia, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Mauritius, New Zealand, Peru, Rwanda, Slovenia, the British Virgin Islands, and Florida. 
103 See Part IV(H). 
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(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law 
of which, that award was made. 
Further grounds, which are occasionally invoked by domestic courts as justification for 
rejecting anti-suit injunctions, are provided in paragraph 2: 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought 
finds that: 
 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the law of that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of that country  
Arguments based on public policy were advanced by counsel in Gazprom104 and Four 
Seasons Hotels and Resorts BV v Consorcio Barr SA (“Four Seasons v Consorcio”).105  
(a) Four Seasons v Conscorcio 
The United States Court of Appeal in Four Seasons upheld an anti-suit injunction ordered by 
an arbitral tribunal against parallel proceedings in Venezuela.  
Four Seasons involved an agreement regarding the construction and operation of a hotel in 
Venezuela.106 Under the agreement, Consorcio (a Venezuelan company) built the hotel, and 
Four Seasons (a company registered in Barbados) ran the hotel.107 A dispute arose between 
the parties, so Four Seasons invoked an arbitration clause contained in the agreement.108 An 
arbitral tribunal was subsequently constituted in Florida.109 
Corsorcio considered arbitration inappropriate for the issues at dispute, so in parallel to the 
arbitration proceedings, Corscorco initiated court proceedings Venezuela.110 Four Seasons 
sought a court-ordered anti-suit injunction from a court in the United States, but this was 
refused.111 A similar request to the arbitral tribunal was successful, so the tribunal issued a 
                                                 
104 Gazprom OAO, above n 10 and 11. 
105 Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts BV v Consorcio Barr SA 377 F 3d 1164 (11th Cir 2004). 
106 At [2]. 
107 At [2]. 
108 At [3] 
109 At [3]. 
110 At [3]. 
111 At [4]. 
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partial award ordering Consorcio to cease the Venezuelan proceedings in favour of 
arbitration.112 The Venezuelan court held that the disputes were not suited to arbitration, and 
found that it had jurisdiction to hear the disputes.113 Consequently, Four Seasons sought 
confirmation of the injunction from the Florida District Court.114 The District Court 
confirmed the award, after which Consorcio appealed to the United States Court of Appeal.  
On appeal, Consorcio argued against the enforcement of the anti-suit injunction on public 
policy grounds.115 It argued that the injunction violated public policy on the grounds that it 
was contrary to international comity, since it prohibited Consorcio “from filing a suit in 
Venezuela despite a Venezuelan courts’ determination that Venezuelan courts have authority 
to resolve the dispute”.116  
The Court of Appeal did not decide on Consorcio’s public policy argument, however, 
because Consorcio had failed to raise the argument earlier in the proceedings.117 Four 
Seasons nevertheless provides an example of a public policy argument raised against 
enforcing an anti-suit injunction.  
(b) Gazprom 
Gazprom was a gas supplier in Lithuania.118 It had a long-term gas agreement and 
shareholders’ agreement with a Lithuanian-owned entity.119 The shareholders’ agreement 
contained an arbitration agreement, which in turn contained an exclusive arbitration clause.120 
The clause provided that:121 
[A]ny claim, dispute or contravention in connection with this Agreement or its 
breach, validity, effect, or termination, shall be finally settled by arbitration in 
accordance with the rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce. 
                                                 
112 At [5]. 
113 At [5]. 
114 At [6]. 
115 At [20]. 
116 At [32]. 
117 At [33]. 
118 Gazprom OAO, above n 10, at [23]. 
119 At [25] and [27]. 
120 At [29]. 
121 At [29].  
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Lithuania alleged that Gazprom had breached the shareholder’s agreement.122 Despite the 
arbitration agreement, Lithuania brought an action against Gazprom in a Lithuanian court.123  
Gazprom filed a request for arbitration, and argued that Lithuania had breached the exclusive 
arbitration clause by initiating proceedings in Lithuania.124 The arbitral tribunal granted an 
anti-suit injunction against Lithuania, on the basis that Lithuania had breached the 
shareholders’ agreement, and ordered Lithuania to withdraw its domestic court 
proceedings.125  
The domestic proceedings continued despite the anti-suit injunction, and the court found for 
Lithuania. It held that the issue was within the scope of the court’s jurisdiction, and could not 
be subject to arbitration.126 Gazprom appealed the court’s decision, seeking recognition and 
enforcement of the injunction in accordance with the New York Convention.127 The court 
rejected Gazprom’s appeal, however, and said that because the issue had already been subject 
to a domestic court hearing, it could not be subject to arbitration.128 The court added that it 
considered the injunction in breach of a principle in the Lithuanian constitution, namely “the 
principle of the independence of judicial authorities”.129 Therefore, article V(2)(b) of the New 
York Convention supported the court’s refusal to enforce the injunction.130 
Gazprom further appealed the decision to a higher Lithuanian court, the Lietuvos 
Aukščiausiasis Teismas (“LAT”).131 The LAT stayed the proceedings, and referred various 
questions to the ECJ.132  
(i) Public policy arguments 
Advocate-General Wathelet said in his opinion that the public policy exception to the 
requirement that state parties to the New York Convention enforce arbitral awards should be 
used sparingly, with article V(2)(b) requiring a strict interpretation.133  
                                                 
122 At [30]. 
123 At [31]-[32]. 
124 At [33]. 
125 At [37]. 
126 At [38]. 
127 At [39]. 
128 At [41-42]. 
129 At [43]. 
130 At [43]. 
131 At [46]. 
132 At [47]. 
133 At [172]. 
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While ultimately whether an award offends a state’s public policy is up to the judicial 
institutions of each member state, and each state’s case law, the Advocate-General said that 
the exception is:134   
[A] safety valve to be used in exceptional circumstances when it would be 
impossible for a legal system to recognise an award and enforce it without 
abandoning the very fundamentals on which it is based.  
The threshold that must be reached for domestic courts to invoke the public policy exception 
and refuse to enforce an anti-suit injunction on this basis is a high one, and will only be 
satisfied in exceptional cases that breach a state’s fundamental principles. The Advocate-
General goes as far as to say that to reach the threshold, violations must:135  
Constitute a manifest breach of the of the rule of law regarded as essential in the 
legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or a right being recognised 
as being fundamental within that legal order. 
The public policy exception cannot be used where the award merely bears the risk of 
“pecuniary damage” or threatens “economic interests”.136 
(c) Conclusion 
Advocate-General Wathelet’s opinion in Gazprom indicates that the public policy exception 
can only be invoked in a limited range of circumstances. If this were not the case, considering 
the enforcement difficulties discussed Part II (B)(3), the effectiveness of anti-suit injunctions 
would be severely limited.  
The following section considers other cases relevant to anti-suit injunctions. 
C Development of Tribunal-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Part II(C) will canvas the development of anti-suit injunctions through various cases. It 
begins with early cases concerning anti-suit injunctions, and then considers Gazprom.137 The 
purpose of this section is to provide readers with an understanding of the cases in which anti-
suit injunctions may arise, so as to paint the backdrop against which arguments regarding the 
proper scope of anti-suit injunctions are made.  
                                                 
134 At [166]. 
135 At [172]. 
136 At [176]. 
137 Gazprom OAO, above n 10 and 11.  
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1 Early Cases in Support of, and Against, Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued in ICSID Arbitration 
This section discusses cases in which ICSID tribunals have considered awarding anti-suit 
injunctions. It seeks to map the development of anti-suit injunctions as a legitimate tool used 
by tribunals to uphold parties’ agreements to exclusively arbitrate.  
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention is significant to many of the cases discussed in this 
section: 
Article 26 
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise 
stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. 
A Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial 
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention. 
The article provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals, “unless otherwise 
stated”. 
(a) Cases in support of anti-suit injunctions 
A number of cases have lent support to tribunals having the power to grant anti-suit 
injunctions. Even where mere recommendations have been made, as is the case in ICSID 
arbitration, the recommendations are generally followed in practice.  
An early instance of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunction is MINE v Guinea (“MINE”).138 In 
MINE, an ICSID tribunal recommendation that domestic courts should stay proceedings was 
taken into account in a decision by domestic courts to decline MINE’s request to maintain 
attachments against Guinea.139 The tribunal had recommended that “MINE immediately 
withdraw and permanently discontinue all pending litigation in national courts and 
commence no new action arising out of the dispute … [and] dissolve every existing 
provisional measure in litigation in national courts”.140 
MINE illustrates the strong influence that tribunal recommendations can have on domestic 
courts where parallel proceedings have arisen.141 MINE provides “unequivocal support to the 
protection of ICSID exclusivity vis-à-vis domestic proceedings by way of provisional 
                                                 
138 MINE v Guinea (Award) ICSID 06 January 1988. 
139 Cited in Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, above n 49, at [60]. 
140 At [60]. 
141 At [35]. 
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measures”, which is apparent from the clear language used by the arbitral tribunal 
recommending the anti-suit injunction, and “also from the threat of sanctions and the eventual 
award of damages for failure to comply with the tribunal’s recommendations in a timely 
fashion.”142 
Vacuum Salt v Ghana (“Vacuum Salt”) also provides support for anti-suit injunctions ordered 
by tribunals in support of arbitration over domestic proceedings.143 In Vacuum Salt, Ghana 
promised to stay proceedings in domestic courts until after the parties had either resolved 
their dispute by agreement or ICSID arbitration had resulted in a recommendation.144 
An arbitral tribunal also recommended an anti-suit injunction in CSOB v Slovakia 
(“CSOB”).145 In CSOB, the tribunal recommended an anti-suit injunction in support of 
arbitration, targeted at suspending parallel domestic bankruptcy proceedings.146 The 
injunction was issued to ensure the parties’ rights to an “exclusive remedy” under article 26 
of the ICSID Convention were preserved.147 The tribunal found that the injunction was 
necessary because of the risk that the bankruptcy proceedings would touch on issues also 
under consideration in the arbitration proceedings.148  
(b) Cases in which tribunals did not order or recommend anti-suit injunctions 
An arbitral tribunal rejected a request for an anti-suit injunction in Atlantic Triton v Guinea 
(“Atlantic Triton”).149 Schreuer suggests that the decision “can be taken as an indication that 
[the Tribunal] was generally disinclined to interfere with domestic proceedings directed at 
obtaining conservatory measures”.150 
                                                 
142 At [87]. 
143 Vacuum Salt Products Limited v Government of the Republic of Ghana (Decision on Provisional Measures) 
(1993) 4 ICSID Reports 324, cited in Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, above n 49. 
144 Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, above n 49, at [89]. 
145 CSOB v Slovakia (Procedural Order No 3) 5 November 1998, cited in Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a 
commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, above n 49, at [90]. Also discussed above in Part II(A).  
146 Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, above n 49, at [90]. 
147 At [90] 
148 At [90]. 
149 Atlantic Triton v Guinea (Interim Award) ICSID ARB/84/1, 18 December 1984. See Paul D Friedland 
“Provisional Measures and ICSID Arbitration” (1986) 2(4) Arb Int 335. 
150 Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, above n 49, at [59]. 
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In Holiday Inns v Morocco (“Holiday Inns”), an arbitral tribunal refused to recommend an 
anti-suit injunction.151 The tribunal said that an anti-suit injunction would be “beyond the 
framework of provisional measures which the tribunal could consider”.152 The tribunal noted, 
however, that it was “motivated by general caution and did not want to confront the state 
party at an early stage of the proceedings”.  
(c) Conclusion 
While MINE and CSOB provide clear support for anti-suit injunctions ordered by arbitral 
tribunals, Holiday Inns and Atlantic Triton “ultimately evade the issue”, so the cases “cannot 
be taken as authority that ICSID tribunals lack the power” to issue anti-suit injunctions.153 
Moreover, in Holiday Inns, the tribunal might have refused to grant an anti-suit injunction 
because the case was one of the very first ICSID cases to go to arbitration, and also since the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction was unclear at the time the injunction was sought.154  
Both Holiday Inns and Atlantic Triton are approximately thirty years old, and it seems highly 
likely that the results would have differed in the light of developments since the 1980s. These 
developments include the 2006 amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law,155 and 
increasing acceptance of anti-suit injunctions as reflected in recent cases. In any case, arbitral 
tribunals continue to have the power to issue anti-suit injunctions, although the enforceability 
of the injunctions remains uncertain in some jurisdictions, as discussed above in Part II(B)(3).  
2 Gazprom 
This section analyses the Gazprom case, with particular focus on the rationale put forward by 
Advocate-General Wathelet and the ECJ for distinguishing between tribunal and court-
ordered anti-suit injunctions. The facts of Gazprom are set out in II(A)(4) above. 
The ECJ decision, and the opinion of Advocate-General Wathelet, both consider the issue of 
whether court-ordered and tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions were sufficiently 
distinguishable, such that tribunal-ordered injunctions could be permitted in EU despite the 
                                                 
151 Unreported, but see discussion in Pierre Lalive “The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday Inns v 
Morocco) – Some Legal Problems” (1980) 51(1) BYBIL 123. Cited in Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a 
commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, above n 49, at [52]. 
152 At [52]. 
153 At [62]. 
154 At [92]. 
155 Discussed above at Part II(B)(1) and below at Part IV(A). 
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Brussels I Regulation, which (as interpreted in West Tankers156) prohibits court-ordered anti-
suit injunctions.157  
(d) Opinion of Advocate-General Wathelet 
Prior to the ECJ decision, Advocate-General Wathelet concluded in an opinion that the 
amended Brussels I Regulation did not prevent tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions, because 
of the arbitration exclusion in recital 12.158 Recital 12 provides that “ancillary proceedings 
relating to…an arbitral procedure” are not within the scope of the Regulation.159  
The Advocate-General said that his position was “wholly consistent” with article II(3) of the 
1958 New York Convention, which provides that unless an arbitration agreement is 
determined to be invalid or incapable of being performed, any disputes that fall within its 
scope must be referred by courts to arbitral tribunals at the request of a party to the dispute.160 
It is interesting that the Advocate-General cites the article in support of his position, because 
the article was cited for the ECJ’s contrary stance in West Tankers on court-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions.161 He reasoned that tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions were necessary to 
ensure that arbitral tribunals have a mechanism by which they can respond to requests to 
remedy breaches of arbitration agreements.162 
Regarding the enforcement of anti-suit injunctions, the Advocate-General said that whether 
anti-suit injunctions are enforceable in EU member states depends on each state’s 
interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention.163 Each member state must determine 
whether it will decline to enforce anti-suit injunctions for public policy reasons, but the 
public policy exception in art V(2)(b) of the Convention should be subject to strict 
interpretation and only available in rare cases.164 
(e) ECJ judgment 
The ECJ upheld the West Tankers decision, which held that court-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions are not compatible with the Brussels I Regulation.165 This was on the basis that 
                                                 
156 Discussed further below in Part III (B). 
157 Gazprom OAO, above n 10, at [47]. 
158 At [140]. 
159 Brussels I Regulation, cited in Gazprom OAO, above n 10, at [141]. 
160 At [152]. 
161 See discussion in Part III(B). 
162 Gazprom OAO, above n 10, at [155]. 
163 At [158]. 
164 At [172]. Discussed in further detail above in Part II(C)(4). 
165 Gazprom OAO, above n 11, at [32-33]. 
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court-ordered anti-suit injunctions deprive foreign courts of the ability to rule on their own 
jurisdiction.166  
According to the ECJ, court-ordered anti-suit injunctions go against the principle of mutual 
trust, which is the trust states place in each other’s “legal systems and judicial institutions”.167 
They are also problematic because they prevent parties from instigating court proceedings, 
even when there are genuine concerns about the validity of an arbitration agreement or the 
extent to which it can be performed.168  
Anti-suit injunctions issued by courts are, however, distinguishable from tribunal-ordered 
injunctions.169 The ECJ said that the principle of mutual trust is irrelevant in the context of 
tribunal-ordered injunctions, because arbitral tribunals do not represent any particular 
states.170  
Moreover, tribunal-ordered injunctions do not affect parties’ ability to question the validity or 
applicability of arbitration agreements in domestic courts:171 
[A]n arbitral tribunal’s prohibition of a party from bringing certain claims before a 
court of a Member State cannot deny that party judicial protection … since, in the 
proceedings for recognition and enforcement of such an arbitral award, first, that 
party could contest the recognition and enforcement, and, second, the court seised 
would have to determine, on the basis of applicable national procedural law and 
international law, whether or not the award should be recognised and enforced. 
In harmony with Advocate-General Wathelet’s opinion, the ECJ said that tribunal-ordered 
injunctions differ from court-ordered injunctions because unlike the courts, arbitral tribunals 
cannot impose direct sanctions upon non-compliant parties.172 The ECJ confirmed that recent 
EU legal developments prohibiting court ordered anti-suit injunctions did not extend to 
tribunal ordered injunctions,173 and said that tribunal-ordered injunctions are less problematic 
because they do not involve one State’s courts interfering with the courts of another State.174 
Another factor provided by the ECJ in support of anti-suit injunctions is the limited ability of 
                                                 
166 At [33] 
167 At [34]. 
168 At [34]. 
169 At [35]. 
170 At [37]. 
171 At [38]. 
172 At [38]. 
173 At [36]. 
174 At [37]. 
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tribunals, when compared with domestic courts, to impose penalties for non-compliance with 
anti-suit injunctions.175  
The ECJ does not, however, consider public policy arguments, as was considered by the 
Advocate-General Wathelet in his opinion. While the effect of the ECJ judgment in Gazprom 
is that anti-suit injunctions from arbitral tribunals are allowed in EU member states, and are 
subject only to limitations imposed by each state’s interpretation of enforcement provisions in 
the 1958 New York Convention, it does not provide clear support for the injunctions. It 
merely says that whether the injunctions are enforceable or not depends on each individual 
member state.  
Before putting forward arguments relating to the proper scope of tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions, this paper will consider court-ordered anti-suit injunctions in part III. 
  
                                                 
175 At [40]. 
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III Court-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Part III briefly discusses court-ordered anti-suit injunctions. They are relevant to this paper, 
because arguments against court-ordered anti-suit injunctions are often used in support of 
arguments against tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions. Court-ordered anti-suit injunctions 
share similarities with tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions, and are issued for a similar 
purpose: to uphold contractual agreements to arbitrate to the exclusion of other forms of 
dispute resolution. Recent developments in the EU following the Brussels I Regulation and 
the West Tankers decision on court-ordered anti-suit injunctions have made the debate about 
the proper scope of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions more significant.  
A Court-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions in Common Law Jurisdictions 
1 Court-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions Generally 
Court-ordered anti-suit injunctions are a long utilised, accepted tool in common law 
jurisdictions, having been used in England since at least the early 1900s.176 The injunctions 
developed in the United States in parallel with developments in England.177 The injunctions 
are thought to have originated in the 1821 English case of Bushby v Munday, which involved 
Scottish proceedings that an English court thought were better suited to determination in 
England.178 To prevent the Scottish proceedings from continuing, the English court issued an 
anti-suit injunction.179 
In England, court-ordered anti-suit injunctions are defined as:180 
[A]n order made by an English court requiring a party in personam to the 
jurisdiction of the English courts not to bring or advance particular claims, to 
withdraw such claims, or take the necessary steps to terminate or suspend 
proceedings pending before a national court or tribunal, or arbitral tribunal, 
established in a foreign country. 
The purpose of court-ordered anti-suit injunctions is to prevent a party from being denied its 
rights under an arbitration agreement to resort to arbitration where damages would be 
                                                 
176 Sir Lawrence Collins and others (eds) Dicey, Morris & Collins: The Conflict of Laws (14th ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2006) at [16-088]. 
177 Jonathan RC Arkins “Borderline Legal: Anti-Suit Injunctions in Common Law Jurisdictions” (2001) 18(6) J. 
Int’l Arb. 603 at 605-606. 
178 At 604. 
179 At 604. 
180 Gazprom OAO, above n 10, at [63]. 
LAWS521 Final Paper Stephanie Lie Luxford 
 
35 
 
insufficient to remedy the situation.181 The injunctions have historically been used relatively 
liberally by English courts.182 
Four principles eventually became settled law with regards to anti-suit injunctions ordered by 
courts. The principles are:183  
 The injunction must be required  in the interests of justice; 
 The injunctions is ordered in personam, that is, against one of the parties rather than 
against the foreign court itself; 
 The party against whom the injunction is ordered must be capable of control by the 
English court; and 
 The court must exercise caution in determining whether to issue the anti-suit 
injunction. 
There are two circumstances in which English courts will grant an anti-suit injunction.184 The 
first is where one of the parties has acted unconscionably. This unconscionable action 
includes conduct that is “oppressive or vexatious”.185 The second circumstance is where one 
party’s legal or equitable rights have been breached.186 Parties seeking an anti-suit injunction 
must also ensure that their applications are made without delay.187 
2 Court-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions Specifically in Support of Arbitration 
In the context of international arbitration, anti-suit injunctions have been used to uphold 
parties’ obligations to exclusively arbitrate to the exclusion of other fora.188 Cases in which 
anti-suit injunctions are issued by courts in support of arbitration are those that would not be 
caught by article II of the New York Convention. Article II provides that where two parties 
have agreed to exclusively arbitrate disputes, and one party then decides to pursue the matter 
in court, the court of Contracting States must refer the parties to arbitration. 
                                                 
181 Sir Lawrence Collins and others (eds) Dicey, Morris & Collins: The Conflict of Laws, above n 176, at [16-
088]. 
182 At [16-088]. See discussion from [16-088]-[16-093]  for discussion of various cases in which English courts 
have issued anti-suit injunctions. 
183 From Societe Nationelle Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak & Anor [1987] 1 AC 871 (PC) at 892, cited 
in Arkins “Borderline Legal: Anti-Suit Injunctions in Common Law Jurisdictions”, above n 177, at 607. 
184 Hakeem Seriki “Anti-suit Injunctions and Arbitration: A Final Nail in the Coffin?” (2006) 23(1) J. Int’l Arb. 
25 at 26. 
185 At 26. 
186 At 26. 
187 Arkins “Borderline Legal: Anti-Suit Injunctions in Common Law Jurisdictions”, above n 177, at 613; and 
Seriki “Anti-Suit Injunctions and Arbitration: A Final Nail in the Coffin?”, above n 183, at 26. 
188 See Sir Lawrence Collins and others (eds) Dicey, Morris & Collins: The Conflict of Laws , above n 176, at 
[16-088]-[16-093]  for discussion of various cases in which English courts have issued anti-suit injunctions. 
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B Court-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
Anti-suit injunctions are less common in civil law jurisdictions. In civil law jurisdictions, 
courts are usually more reluctant to accept anti-suit injunctions, normally on the basis that 
they constitute a state court unjustifiably interfering with the judicial processes of another 
state.189 This is reflected in earlier cases, as well as more recently in the stance taken by the 
ECJ in West Tankers. 
In West Tankers, West Tankers had chartered a vessel to Erg Petroli SpA (“Erg”).190 The 
charter contract included an arbitration agreement, which was governed by English law and 
provided for arbitration in London.191 The vessel damaged an Italian jetty that Erg owned, so 
Erg lodged a claim with its insurers, Allianz SpA and Generali Assicuraziona Generali SpA 
(“Allianz and Generali”) for compensation.192 The insurance paid out to Erg was insufficient 
to cover the full extent of damage caused by the chartered vessel, so Erg initiated arbitration 
in London under the arbitration agreement for the excess.193 Concurrently, Allianz and 
Generali sued West Tankers in the Tribunale di Siracusa, an Italian court, for the 
compensation it paid to Erg.194 The grounds for this action was Allianz and Generali’s right 
to subrogation, regarding Erg’s claim for the damaged wharf, under Italian law.195 
West Tankers objected to the Italian proceedings, on the grounds that the court did not have 
jurisdiction because of the arbitration agreement in the charter contract.196 It also commenced 
proceedings in England, in which it sought an anti-suit injunction in support of exclusive 
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement.197 West Tankers requested an 
injunction against the insurers, Allianz and Generali, that would both prevent them from 
pursuing any court proceedings  in relation to the damaged jetty and require them to cease the 
Italian proceedings that had already commenced.198 
The House of Lords considered cases that had held that anti-suit injunctions were 
incompatible with the Brussels I Regulation. The House of Lords said, however, that it 
should be able to issue an anti-suit injunction because of article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I 
                                                 
189 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 176. 
190 West Tankers, above n 7, at [9]. 
191 At [9]. 
192 At [10]. 
193 At [10]. 
194 At [11]. 
195 At [11]. 
196 At [11]. 
197 At [12]. 
198 At [12]. 
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Regulation, which provides an exclusion for arbitration.199 It reasoned that the exclusion 
should extend not only to arbitration itself, but also to legal proceedings where the subject-
matter is arbitration. Therefore, the Brussels I Regulation should not preclude the House of 
Lords from having the power to issue an anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration.200 
Before coming to a decision, however, the House of Lords decided to stay proceedings and 
seek a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice on whether court-ordered anti-
suit injunctions are compatible with the Brussels I Regulation.201 
The ECJ held that an anti-suit injunction from the House of Lords would be incompatible 
with the Regulation, because it would “necessarily amount to stripping that court [the Italian 
court] of the power to rule on its own jurisdiction”.202 The court said that court-ordered anti-
suit injunctions are in breach of the general principle that every court has the power to 
determine its own jurisdiction,203 and are contrary to the principle of mutual trust.204  
An anti-suit injunction would also prevent the Italian court from giving a ruling on whether 
the arbitration agreement was valid or relevant to the dispute at hand, so would preclude 
Allianz and Generali from accessing and seeking protection from the court.205 The ECJ also 
found that EU member states’ courts’ inability to issue anti-suit injunctions in support of 
arbitration was consistent with article II(3) of the New York Convention.206 The article 
provides that where a court has proceedings brought before it that are subject to an arbitration 
agreement, it must refer the parties to arbitration at the request of either of the parties, except 
where the arbitration agreement is invalid or ‘incapable of being performed’.207 
C Conclusion 
While court-ordered anti-suit injunctions remain permissible in non-EU member states, such 
as the United States, and depends on each state’s laws, their use in the EU following the West 
Tankers decision was prohibited. Following the ECJ decision in West Tankers, uncertainty 
arose as to the continued legitimate use of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions in support of 
arbitration. This uncertainty centred on whether tribunal-ordered injunctions, too, came 
within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, and this uncertainty remained unresolved until 
                                                 
199 At [14]-[15]. 
200 At [15-17]. 
201 At [18]. 
202 At [28].  
203 At [28]. The argument that anti-suit injunctions deprive the foreign court of its powers/rights to rule on its 
own jurisdiction is an argument also commonly cited as a reason why tribunal-ordered injunctions should not be 
permitted. See Part IV(F). 
204 At [30]. Mutual trust is discussed in Part IV(E)(2). 
205 At [31]. This argument ties in with arguments in Part IV(G). 
206 At [33]. 
207 At [33]. 
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the ECJ decision in Gazprom. The ECJ in Gazprom held, however, that anti-suit injunctions 
remain an option available to arbitral tribunals faced with parallel proceedings, although their 
enforceability is not guaranteed in all jurisdictions. Part III(D), considers the advantages and 
disadvantages of court- versus arbitration- ordered anti-suit injunctions. 
D Comparison between court-ordered and tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions, with 
particular focus on the enforceability of the injunctions 
Gazprom illustrates that the issuance of anti-suit injunctions by arbitral tribunals is still 
acceptable practice within the EU, and is not affected by Brussels I Regulation. Therefore, 
whether an anti-suit injunction is enforceable in EU member states, and in other jurisdictions 
globally, depends on each state’s recognition and acceptance of tribunal ordered provisional 
measures. This section compares the benefits and drawbacks of anti-suit injunctions, 
comparing court-ordered injunctions with tribunal-ordered injunctions.  
Tribunal-ordered and court-ordered anti-suit injunctions seem prima facie similar in both 
their purpose and effect. They are issued to support arbitration, and provided parties comply, 
their effect is to require parties to desist from parallel proceedings for the duration of the 
arbitral proceedings. Yet for all their similarities, the ECJ has differentiated between the 
injunctions in Gazprom,208 and the UN has amended the UNCITRAL model law to reflect the 
growing acceptance expressed internationally for tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions.209 
Tribunal-ordered injunctions have been supported in substantial amount of case law, and 
various arguments in support of their continued use, and against restricting their use in 
international arbitration, have been put forward, as is discussed in part IV. 
One significant advantage of court-ordered anti-suit injunctions generally is their direct 
enforceability in the state of the courts that have issued the injunction. By contrast, tribunal-
ordered anti-suit injunctions are not necessarily enforceable, even in states that are party to 
the New York Convention. Applying directly to the courts can also save time and cost, 
because tribunal ordered anti-suit injunctions may need to be confirmed by national courts 
before they can be enforced.210 This was illustrated in Four Seasons v Consorcio,211 in which 
Four Seasons had to apply to the United States District Court (the “USDC’) for confirmation 
of a tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunction ordering Consorcio to stay proceedings in 
Venezuela.  
                                                 
208 See discussion in Part II(C)(2). 
209 See discussion in Part II(B)(1). 
210 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [23-84]. 
211 Four Seasons v Consorcio, above n 105. See discussion in Part II(B)(4). 
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On the other hand, it is broadly accepted internationally that arbitral tribunals should order 
provisional measures where possible, because tribunals are better equipped than national 
courts to determine whether provisional measures, such as anti-suit injunctions, are 
appropriate.212 While unlike courts, tribunals usually cannot impose direct penalties for non-
compliance, parties still have an incentive to comply with tribunal ordered provisional 
measures, because arbitral tribunals have shown a willingness to impose higher costs on 
parties who fail to comply with provisional measures.213  
As mentioned in part III(B), the West Tankers decision limits the availability of court-ordered 
anti-suit injunctions, so parties now have no choice other than to seek injunctions from 
tribunals for disputes in EU member states. In jurisdictions outside of the EU, court-ordered 
anti-suit injunctions may still be permitted, and may be a better option in jurisdictions that 
have not adopted the most recent amendments to the UNCITAL Model Law. In countries that 
have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law amendments however, anti-suit injunctions are 
enforceable, so are a good choice for parties seeking to stay parallel proceedings.214 
  
                                                 
212 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [23-14]. 
213 At [23-84]. 
214 Refer to discussion in Part II(B)(3). 
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IV Proper Scope of Tribunal-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Part IV considers arguments regarding the proper scope of tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions. Key arguments considered relate to amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law; 
commercial reasons supporting tribunal-ordered injunctions; the risk of conflicting decisions; 
private contractual arrangements versus sovereign authority; competence-competence; the 
right of access to justice; enforcement difficulties; the disruption and potentially 
disproportionate harm purportedly caused by anti-suit injunctions; and the argument that 
tribunal- and court-ordered injunctions should receive the same treatment.  
Restrictions posed by various academics and commentators are also summarised, with 
arguments against these restrictions put forward. 
A The UNCITRAL Model Law and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
Amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law in 2006 reflect a “trend in favour of limiting 
and clearly defining court involvement in international commercial arbitration”.215 The 
Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the Model Law justifies these 
amendments on the basis that by entering into an arbitration agreement, the parties have 
consciously decided to use arbitration to the exclusion of domestic court processes.216 It adds 
that aside from exceptions provided in legislation based on the Model Law, courts should not 
intervene in arbitration proceedings, because of article 5:217 
Article 5. Extent of court intervention 
In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided 
in this Law.  
UNCITRAL decided explicitly to adopt the amendments, which provide expressly for anti-
suit injunctions ordered by tribunals, through article 17(2)(b) and their enforcement via 
article 17H, despite arguments made against the injunctions.218  
 
 
                                                 
215 UNCITRAL Model Law Explanatory Note, above n 65, at [15]. See also discussion in Part II(B)(1) and (3). 
216 At [15]. 
217 At [16] and [17]. 
218 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the work of its thirty-ninth 
session, above n 75, at [93]. The rationale for the amendments is discussed above in Part II(B)(1). 
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The arguments put forward include:219 
In support of deletion, it was stated that anti-suit injunctions did not always have 
the provisional nature of interim measures but could also relate to substantive 
matters such as questions relating to the competence of the arbitral tribunal. It was 
also said that such a provision derogated from the fundamental principle that a 
party should not be deprived of any judicial remedy to which it was entitled. 
The amendments indicate a clear acceptance of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions as a tool 
available in support of arbitration. Clear support of anti-suit injunctions from UNCITRAL, a 
“subsidiary body of the General Assembly of the United Nations”, surely has great weight.220 
This is especially so, considering its “general mandate to further the progressive 
harmonisation and unification of the law of international trade”, and the involvement of 
representatives from numerous states in the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law.221 
Moreover, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are nearly identical to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, which is significant, because the rules are representative of “international arbitration 
practice and provide a milestone for review in many arbitrations under other systems”.222  
B Commercial Reasons 
Agreements to exclusively arbitrate have commercial value.223 For some contracts, they may 
be a deal breaker, as is illustrated by the following statement from a United States Supreme 
Court judgment in relation to an “exclusive jurisdiction clause”:224 
There is strong evidence that the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement 
and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their 
negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the 
forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations.  
Restricting arbitral tribunals’ powers to issue anti-suit injunctions inevitably reduces the 
effectiveness of exclusive arbitration clauses. This is especially so, with the reduced 
availability of court-ordered anti-suit injunctions after West Tankers, and the fact that some 
parallel proceedings will not necessarily be caught by article II of the 1958 New York 
                                                 
219 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the work of its thirty-ninth 
session, above n 75, at [93] 
220 UNCITRAL “FAQ – Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL” <www.uncitral.org>.  
221 UNCITRAL “FAQ – Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL” <www.uncitral.org>. 
222 Lew, Mistelis and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [2-36]. 
223 Andrew Bell Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003) at [5.06]. 
224 The Chaparral 407 US 1, 13 (1972); [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 315 at 320-321; cited in Bell Forum Shopping 
and Venue in Transnational Litigation, above n 223, at [5.06]. 
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Convention.225 The importance of anti-suit injunctions to international trade was also 
recognised by UNCITRAL when developing the amendments to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law.226 It said that “the effectiveness of arbitration as a method of settling commercial 
disputes depend[s] on the possibility of enforcing such interim measures”.227  
Arbitration agreements also provide commercial certainty. They provide certainty as to where 
any disputes will be litigated, which can be incredibly important, especially for commercial 
contracts involving parties based in jurisdictions with potentially partial judicial systems. 
They provide a better guarantee of neutrality, because in arbitration both parties generally 
play a role in choosing the arbitrators that comprise the arbitral tribunal.228  
Arbitral tribunals also provide the benefit of being private proceedings, and are sometimes 
perceived to have greater “commerciality”.229 Thus toothless exclusive arbitration clauses, 
rendered so through restricting tribunals’ powers to grant anti-suit injunctions, would reduce 
this commercial certainty, and in turn provide a deterrent to international trade. This is 
reiterated in The Chaparral case:230 
Manifestly, much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties 
could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident 
might occur … The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on 
a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international 
trade, commerce, and contracting.  
Bell argues that a failure to enforce exclusive jurisdiction clauses might also lead to parties 
engaging in forum shopping.231 This would result in wasted time and money, expended by 
parties “shopping around” for the forum that best suits their dispute.232 
C Conflicting Decisions 
Another reason in support of allowing anti-suit injunctions from arbitral tribunals, and against 
unduly narrowing their scope, is the risk of conflicting decisions that can arise should parallel 
                                                 
225 See Part III(A)(2) and Part III(B). 
226 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its thirty-ninth session, 
above n 75, at [88]. 
227 At [88]. 
228 Bell Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation, above n 223, at [5.07]. 
229 At [5.07]. 
230 At [5.08]. 
231 At [5.12]. 
232 At [5.13]. 
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proceedings be allowed to continue.233 The risk of conflicting decisions was cited as a reason 
in support of anti-suit injunctions in both Gazprom234 and Millicom v Senegal.235 The 
problem with conflicting decisions is that they can potentially affect the enforcement of 
arbitration awards, which is why article 17(2)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law enables 
tribunals to order interim measure to prevent actions that may cause “current or imminent 
harm or prejudice to arbitral process itself”. 
Allowing arbitral tribunals to issue anti-suit injunctions ensures that the principle that 
“arbitrators must render an award capable of being enforced” is adhered to, by preventing the 
issuance of conflicting decisions that may affect future enforcement of awards.236 It also 
ensures adherence to the principle of “non-interference”, which prohibits courts from 
interfering with arbitration except if interference is necessary to enforce arbitral awards or 
issue interim measures.237 
Restricting tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions to the extent that conflicting decisions are 
allowed to occur would lead to wasted resources as parties have no choice but to defend their 
case fully in two different forums.238 Ensuring tribunals have the power to order anti-suit 
injunctions when required would prevent this waste.  
D Lack of Precedent 
Tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions are also said to lack a “uniform framework” or “general 
rules”, and so are argued to need a more restricted scope.239 In comparison, court-ordered 
anti-suit injunctions are based on a body of case law built up over time.240 Anti-suit 
injunctions ordered by courts may be based on precedent, but depending on the parties’ 
arbitration agreements, tribunals may have to adhere to requirements in various laws, rules, 
and conventions, as discussed above in part II(B). Tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions, 
                                                 
233 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 174. 
234 Gazprom is discussed in greater detail in Parts II(B)(4) and II(C)(2). 
235 See Part II(A) for the facts of Millicom v Senegal. The case is also used for illustrative purposes throughout 
Part II(B). 
236 Emmanuel Gaillard “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators” in AJ van den Berg (ed) ICCA Congress 
Series No. 13 (2006, ICCA, Montreal) 235 at 240. 
237 Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, above n 49, chapter on article 26, at [3]. 
238 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 174. 
239 At 174. 
240 See discussion above about court-ordered anti-suit injunctions in England, at Part III(A). 
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along with all provisional measures, are temporary, and should only be used sparingly, as was 
emphasised in Millicom v Senegal.241 
E Private Contractual Arrangements, Not Sovereign Authority  
1 Tribunal-Ordered Injunctions Are Not More Offensive Than Court-Ordered Injunctions 
Tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions are said to be more offensive than court-ordered 
injunctions, because the very existence of arbitral tribunals derives from a private contractual 
arrangement between parties.242 By contrast, court-ordered anti-suit injunctions are said to be 
more appropriate because they at least have “sovereign authority”, so their interference with 
other states’ judicial processes is less controversial.243  
The author disagrees. Tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions in support of anti-suit injunctions 
are derived from a private agreement between parties, and their purpose is to uphold parties’ 
private agreements to resort exclusively to arbitration.  
This is supported by various principles:  
 The principle that “parties are bound by their contracts”,244 as reflected in the New 
York Convention’s objective to ensure the enforcement of parties’ arbitration 
agreements;245  
 The principle that parties who have agreed to arbitrate must resort exclusively to 
arbitration when disputes arise;246 and 
 The principle that arbitrators may sanction violations of arbitration agreements, and 
take measures to prevent disputes becoming aggravated or future awards being 
undermined.247 
 
                                                 
241 Millicom v Senegal, Decision on Provisional Measures, above n 22, at [38] and [50]. 
242 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 174. 
243 At 174. 
244 Gaillard and Savage (eds) Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, above n 
45, at [627]. 
245 John J Barcelo “Anti-Foreign Suit Injunctions to Enforce Arbitration Agreements” in Arthur W Rovine (ed) 
Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation – The Fordham Papers 2007 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 2008) 107  at 108. 
246 Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, above n 49, chapter on article 26 at [6]. 
247 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 180-181. Gaillard “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, above n 236, at 
237-238.  
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Gaillard provides an excellent description of the function served by tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions:248 
[Anti-suit injunctions] are in reality nothing more than an order given to the party 
acting in breach of the arbitration agreement to comply with its contractual 
undertaking to arbitrate the dispute it has submitted to domestic courts. 
By agreeing to arbitration through entering into an arbitration agreement, parties relinquish 
their ability to access domestic courts to resolve arbitrable disputes, and domestic courts are 
in turn prohibited from considering the disputes.249 If parties initiate court proceedings in 
breach of an arbitration agreement, courts should refuse to continue with proceedings and 
should refer parties to arbitration so as to uphold the arbitration agreement.250 The only issues 
courts may rule on are whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and whether the dispute 
comes within the scope of the arbitration agreement.251 If these two elements are satisfied, 
arbitrators should be left by the courts to decide their own jurisdiction in accordance with the 
principle of competence-competence.252  
2 The Principle of Mutual Trust is Irrelevant 
It is argued that tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions violate the principle of “mutual trust 
between courts”, imported through article II(3) of the New York Convention.253 The article 
provides: 
Article II(3) 
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect 
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, 
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it 
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed. 
Article II(3) is said to establish “a system for pacific coexistence of arbitration and court 
adjudication” and that where a tribunal orders an anti-suit injunction it disregards the system 
by signalling that:254 
                                                 
248 At 239. 
249 At 241. 
250 At 241. 
251 At 242. 
252 At 242. Discussed below at Part IV(F). 
253 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 198. 
254 At 199. 
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 It does not believe the court will be able to reach a fair outcome for the parties; and 
 The tribunal’s will trumps the will of the court.  
The author argues that the principle of mutual trust does not apply to tribunal-ordered 
injunctions. According to the ECJ in Gazprom, anti-suit injunctions from arbitral tribunals are 
different from court-ordered injunctions, since arbitrators are not the representatives of 
particular states.255 Therefore, anti-suit injunctions ordered by tribunals do not violate the 
sovereignty of other states, do not violate the principle of mutual trust, and so are not as 
problematic as court-ordered injunctions.256 
F Competence-Competence: Courts’ Ability to Rule on Their Own Jurisdiction 
Tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions are criticised for breaching international law 
principles.257 One of these is competence-competence. Competence-competence is the 
principle that courts have the ability to rule on their own jurisdiction.258 By ordering an anti-
suit injunction, arbitral tribunals deny courts this power, because by doing so they “implicitly 
declare that any other court or arbitral tribunal is prevented from ruling on the same subject 
matter”.259 Therefore, tribunal-ordered injunctions are inappropriate as they breach the 
principle of competence-competence.260  
The rationale behind competence-competence is to level the playing field between tribunals 
and courts.261 Allowing tribunals to issue anti-suit injunctions is said to elevate tribunals such 
that they are above courts, allowing arbitrators to protect their competence-competence to the 
detriment of courts’ powers.262 While the injunctions are in personam, rather than ordered 
directly against courts, it is argued that the distinction is “more formal  than of substance”, 
                                                 
255 Gazprom OAO, above n 11, at [37]. 
256 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 193; Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators”, above n 9, at 116; and 
Gazprom OAO, above n 11, at [35]-[38]. 
257 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 174. 
258 At 193. Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators”, above n 9, at 116. 
259 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 193; Gaillard “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, above n 236, at 240-
241; Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators”, above n 9, at 117. 
260 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 193; Gaillard “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, above n 236, at 240-
241. This argument is also often cited as a rationale against allowing court-ordered injunctions. 
261 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 194. 
262 At 194. 
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and that in reality, the injunctions have the practical effect of depriving courts of the ability to 
rule on their own jurisdiction.263 
Convincing counter-arguments can be made, however, that tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions do not infringe upon courts’ competence-competence. Tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions do not impede upon courts’ competence-competence, because disputes covered 
by arbitration are simply excluded from state courts’ jurisdiction.264 Where a dispute falls 
outside the scope of an arbitration agreement, or a state court determines that an arbitration 
agreement is invalid or incapable of being performed, the state court is open to continue with 
proceedings and make a decision on the merits of the case.265 Therefore, arguments that 
competence-competence means tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions should be restricted are 
arguably unconvincing.  
G Right of Access to Courts and Justice 
By ordering parties to refrain from filing proceedings in domestic courts, it is argued that 
tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions may deprive parties of their “constitutional right” to 
unimpeded access to justice through states’ judicial institutions.266 This denial of access 
creates a tension between state courts’ powers to protect parties who believe their arbitration 
agreements are invalid and “promoting arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism 
alternative to state court litigation”.267 As a result, arbitrators must take care to ensure parties’ 
access to courts is not infringed upon when they issue anti-suit injunctions.268 
The author argues that anti-suit injunctions do not deny parties the right to access courts and 
seek justice through states’ judicial institutions. First, injunctions are granted against parties, 
rather than against state courts.269 Second, parties waive their right to settle disputes through 
other dispute resolution mechanisms when they agree to arbitration through an exclusive 
arbitration clause.270 By issuing anti-suit injunctions, tribunals are merely upholding 
contractual agreements between parties to submit disputes to arbitration.  
                                                 
263 At 195. 
264 Gaillard “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, above n 236, at 243. 
265 At 243. 
266 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 196; Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators”, above n 9, at 124. 
267 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 196. 
268 Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators”, above n 9, at 124. 
269 This is illustrated by article 17(2)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which allows for anti-suit injunctions to 
be ordered against a party to the dispute, not the other forum in which parallel proceedings are taking place.  
270 This ties in to discussions above under Part IV(E). In particular, the principle that parties who have agreed to 
exclusive arbitration must refer disputes to arbitration if they arise.  
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If a state court believes a final award should not be recognised and enforced because it finds 
the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the court has the final say as to whether the award is 
enforced in that particular state.271 Therefore, parties do not lose any “fundamental” or 
“constitutional” rights through arbitrators issuing anti-suit injunctions; courts may still 
ultimately refuse enforcement if certain criteria are met.272  
H Enforcement Difficulties 
An argument often cited against anti-suit injunctions is their lack of effectiveness because of 
the limited enforcement options on offer to arbitral tribunals facing non-compliant parties.273 
Lévy argues that the lack of remedies available to arbitrators facing recalcitrant parties is one 
ground for restricting the availability of anti-suit injunctions.274  
While the author admits that there may be difficulties enforcing anti-suit injunctions in some 
jurisdictions, they are more enforceable than previously because of the insertion of article 
17H of the UNCITRAL Model Law. As more jurisdictions adopt the amendments, the 
enforceability of anti-suit injunctions will increase.275 
I Anti-Suit Injunctions Are Disruptive And May Cause Disproportionate Harm 
Anti-suit injunctions are argued to be “illegitimate, as they inevitably aggravate the dispute 
and scatter it among various fora”.276 It is also argued that some anti-suit injunctions may 
cause more harm than good, especially when arbitral awards end up unenforceable because of 
arbitrators’ perceived impartiality: by issuing an anti-suit injunction, an arbitrator may be 
thought to have “been a judge for his own cause”.277 Anti-suit injunctions may also delay 
proceedings in domestic courts to the extent that a party loses its ability to initiate court 
proceedings because time limits have lapsed.278 
These arguments are unconvincing. Rather than “scattering” disputes across different forums, 
an anti-suit injunction ensures the dispute is confined to one forum, assuming the recalcitrant 
                                                 
271 Gaillard “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, above n 236, at 242. 
272 At 242. See Part II(B)(4). 
273 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 200. These enforcement difficulties are discussed above in Parts II(B)(3) and 
II(B)(4). 
274 Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators”, above n 9, at 126. 
275 Margaret L Moses The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2008) at 106-107. See discussion in Parts II(B)(3) and (4) above. 
276 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 192. 
277 Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators”, above n 9, at 125. 
278 At 125. 
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party adheres to the anti-suit injunction. It is the denial of anti-suit injunctions that poses the 
risk of conflicting decisions from multiple sources. Regarding the argument that arbitrators 
may be considered impartial as a result of ordering anti-suit injunctions, and thus render any 
final awards unenforceable, this argument is untenable because the arbitrators are selected by 
both parties, and arbitration is usually chosen specifically because of its perceived neutrality 
when compared with domestic courts.279 Lastly, as reiterated above, anti-suit injunctions 
against parties do not prevent them from pursuing domestic court proceedings, as they are 
directed against the parties to a dispute rather than the courts themselves.280 There is nothing 
to prevent a party from taking the dispute to court, albeit in breach of its arbitration 
agreement. 
J Tribunal- And Court-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions Should Receive Identical Treatment 
It is argued that the treatment of anti-suit injunctions should not differ depending on the 
forum that issues them: court and tribunal ordered measures should be treated identically.281 
Irrespective of their source, anti-suit injunctions are ordered for the same purpose, and result 
in the same issues.282  
While this argument may appear to have merit, it fails to acknowledge the differentiation of 
anti-suit injunctions from courts and tribunals by the ECJ in Gazprom,283 and the ECJ’s 
determination that anti-suit injunctions may be enforceable in the EU.284 Moreover, as 
discussed above, there is a fundamental difference between courts and tribunals in that courts 
represent a sovereign state whereas tribunals arise as a result of arbitration agreements 
between private parties.285 Treating court-ordered anti-suit injunctions and tribunal-ordered 
anti-suit injunctions would also be problematic because there is no universal treatment of 
court-ordered anti-suit injunctions universally.286 Common law and civil law jurisdictions 
have different attitudes towards the injunctions, and court-ordered anti-suit injunctions are 
not permitted in the EU as a result of the Brussels I Regulation.287 Therefore, this argument in 
support of restricting the scope of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions is not a strong one.  
 
                                                 
279 Lew, Mistelis, and Kröll Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, above n 1, at [23-122]. 
280 UNCITRAL Model Law, art 17(2)(b). 
281 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 193. 
282 At 193. 
283 Gazprom OAO, above n 11, at [35]. 
284 Gazprom OAO, above n 11, at [41].  
285 At [37]. Refer to Part IV(E). 
286 Refer to discussion in Part III. 
287 Refer to discussion in Part III. 
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K Suggestions on Reducing the Scope of Tribunal-Ordered Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Various restrictions have been put forward the narrow the scope of tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions.  
These include:  
 Restricting the form anti-suit injunctions can take;288  
 Tightening the definition of parallel proceedings, so that an arbitrator may only issue 
an injunction against a party if the parallel proceedings impinge upon the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal;289  
 Requiring “competing jurisdiction” to have actually been created through a ruling in 
the parallel forum;290 and 
 Restricting tribunals’ ability to issue anti-suit injunctions to instances where parties 
have been aggressive, committed fraud, or commenced parallel proceedings to delay 
or frustrate arbitration proceedings.291  
The author rejects these restrictions, and argues that instead the conditions outlined in part II 
and the limitations that apply to provisional measures generally are sufficient. Imposing 
criteria, beyond established requirements and provisions in international arbitration rules, is 
unnecessary: whether a tribunal orders an anti-suit injunction should depend on the 
circumstances of each particular case.292  
Arbitral tribunals should have the power to issue anti-suit injunctions both before and after 
determining their jurisdiction, because they need to be able to order injunctions if necessary 
to ensure parties do not prejudice the arbitral proceedings through parallel proceedings.293 
Requiring abusive behaviour, or delaying/frustration  tactics, from a party before a tribunal 
may order an anti-suit injunctions adds an additional hurdle to a mechanism that is already 
wrought with enforcement difficulties in certain jurisdictions.294  
  
                                                 
288 Vishnevskaya “Anti-suit Injunctions from Arbitral Tribunals in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Necessary Evil?”, above n 3, at 178. 
289 At 188. 
290 At 191. 
291 At 203. Lévy “Anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators”, above n 9, at 126. 
292 Gaillard “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, above n 236, at 261 and 264-265. 
293 At 265-266. 
294 At 263. 
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V Conclusion 
The insertion of article 17(2)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, to provide explicitly for 
tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions as interim measures, and article 17H, which provides 
for the enforcement of provisional measures, is evidence of the growing acceptance 
internationally of anti-suit injunctions.295 The injunctions have been recognised as a 
necessary tool in ensuring the efficient resolution of disputes, and are an important part of 
ensuring the continued flow of international trade.296 UNCITRAL’s express acceptance of the 
injunctions as a legitimate interim measure available to arbitrators lends great support to the 
argument that the scope of injunctions does not need the restrictions suggested in Part 
IV(K).297 
Commercial reasons support the use of anti-suit injunctions by arbitral tribunals in support of 
arbitration.298 Ensuring arbitral tribunals have the power to order anti-suit injunctions means 
that parties to private agreements can be reassured that exclusive arbitration clauses are not 
meaningless in the face of recalcitrant parties pursuing parallel proceedings in domestic 
courts. This certainty may be the extra reassurance needed to ensure parties continue to 
conclude contracts with others situated in less developed countries with judiciaries that may 
not be perceived of as neutral.299 Therefore, in some circumstances ensuring tribunals have 
the power to enforce exclusive arbitration agreements via anti-suit injunctions may enable, or 
at the very least lubricate, international trade.300  
Enabling tribunals to order anti-suit injunctions means they are able to prevent conflicting 
decisions from arising, by staying proceedings before judgments are made in domestic 
courts.301 The risk of conflicting decisions poses a threat to international commercial 
arbitration as a whole, for if parties are unable to enforce awards from arbitral tribunals, there 
is little point in agreeing to arbitration at all. To ensure the entire arbitral process is not 
undermined, anti-suit injunctions must be available to arbitral tribunals faced with parties in 
breach of exclusive arbitration agreements. The injunctions also ensure that parties do not 
expend unnecessary resources by having to defend claims in more than one forum. 
                                                 
295 Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation on the work of its forty-third session 
A/CN.0/589 (2005) at [23]. See discussion at Part IV(A). 
296 At [23]. See discussion at Part II(B)(3). 
297 At [23]. 
298 Refer to discussion in Part IV(B). 
299 See discussion on the importance of exclusive jurisdiction clauses to international trade in The Chaparral, 
above n 224, at 320-321. 
300 This echoes comments made by UNCITRAL in relation to the necessity of the 2006 amendments. See Report 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its thirty-ninth session, above n 
75, at [88]. 
301 Refer to discussion at Parts IV(C) and (I). 
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The lack of precedent followed by arbitral tribunals, while in contrast with the precedents 
available to, and followed by, courts in Commonwealth jurisdictions, is less of an issue 
considering the sparing use of anti-suit injunctions by arbitral tribunals.302 Provided the 
conditions and limitations surrounding the issuance of provisional measures are met,303 
tribunals should have the discretion to issue anti-suit injunctions where it is necessary to 
uphold contractual agreements to arbitrate.  
Anti-suit injunctions at their core seek to uphold private contractual arrangements between 
parties, and so are less abhorrent than court-ordered anti-suit injunctions, which are ordered 
by representatives of sovereign states.304 Their use is supported by various principles,305 and 
does not infringe upon the principle of mutual trust or courts’ competence-competence.306 
The injunctions are in personam against parties, rather than directly against courts, so do not 
interfere directly with court proceedings,307 and do not restrict parties’ access to justice.308 
Moreover, enforcement of anti-suit injunctions is up to the courts, so parties do not lose the 
right of access to courts, as courts ultimately have the final say.309  
Enforcement difficulties are less of an issue following the insertion of article 17H. Its further 
adoption by jurisdictions, along with the other 2006 amendments, will ensure that tribunal-
ordered injunctions are enforceable.310 
Last, tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions differ from court-ordered anti-suit injunctions, so 
it makes little sense for them to be treated identically.311 The differences between the 
injunctions was recognised in Gazprom,312 and this difference means that tribunal-ordered 
anti-suit injunctions are still be enforceable in certain EU member states, whereas court-
ordered anti-suit injunctions are not because of their incompatibility with the Brussels I 
Regulation.313 Moreover, according court- and tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions the same 
                                                 
302 See Millicom v Senegal, Decision on Provisional Measures, above n 22, at [38] and [50] for discussion on the 
temporary nature and sparing use that should be accorded anti-suit injunctions. 
303 Refer to discussion in Part II(B). 
304 Gazprom OAO, above n 11, at [37]. See discussion in Part IV(E). 
305 See Gaillard and Savage (eds) Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, above 
n 45, at [627]; Schreuer The ICSID Convention: a commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, above n 49, chapter on article 26 at [6]; and 
Barcelo “Anti-Foreign Suit Injunctions to Enforce Arbitration Agreements”, above n 245, at 108. 
306 Refer to discussion in Part IV(E) and Part IV(F). 
307 As evidenced by UNCITRAL Model Law, art 17(2)(b). 
308 Refer to discussions at Part IV(G). 
309 Gaillard “Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators”, above n 236, at 242. 
310 Moses The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, above n 275, at 106-107. See 
Parts IV(H) and II(B)(3) and (4). 
311 Refer to discussion in Part IV(J).  
312 Gazprom OAO, above n 11, at [35]. 
313 At [41]. Refer to discussion in Part III(B). 
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treatment would itself prove problematic considering the non-universal treatment of 
injunctions from both forums in different jurisdictions.314 As more jurisdictions adopt the 
amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law, the place of tribunal-ordered anti-suit 
injunctions becomes further cemented as an interim measure available to arbitral tribunals in 
support of arbitration.  
For the above reasons, the use of tribunal-ordered anti-suit injunctions need not be curtailed 
by the restrictions suggested in Part IV(K). They are important in an increasingly globalised 
world, and are necessary to ensure commercial certainty in international trade is not 
diminished. The 2006 amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law reinforce their 
importance. Therefore, the proper scope for anti-suit injunctions is not one weighed by heavy 
restrictions, but rather subject only to existing conditions and limitations.315 
  
                                                 
314 Refer to discussion in Part III. 
315 Refer to discussion in Part II(B). 
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